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Low-wage subsidies are often proposed as a solution to the unemployment problem among 
the low skilled. Yet the empirical evidence on the effects of low-wage subsidies is 
surprisingly scarce. This paper examines the employment effects of a Finnish payroll tax 
subsidy scheme, which is targeted at the employers of older, full-time, low-wage workers. 
The system’s clear eligibility criteria open up an opportunity for a reliable estimation of the 
causal impacts of the subsidy, using a difference-in-difference-in-differences approach. Our 
results indicate that the subsidy system had no effects on the employment rate. However, it 
appears to have increased the probability of part-time workers obtaining full-time 
employment. 
JEL-Code: H24, J23, J68. 
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  1. Introduction 
One way to reduce unemployment among the low skilled is to cut labour taxation for low-
income workers. The basic idea in targeted tax cut is that it decreases the cost of employing 
the target-group workers, and thus increases wages and employment of this group. In theory it 
should not matter whether tax cuts are provided as a wage subsidy to the employers or as an 
equivalent income tax reduction to the workers. However, in practice, the wage subsidy given 
to the employers of low-skilled workers can be more effective in increasing the demand for 
those workers than a reduction in the taxes paid by the employees.
1 The reason is that if 
wages are rigid downwards, the subsidy reduces labour costs and therefore increases labour 
demand more than a reduction in the labour income tax paid by the employees themselves. 
Despite  the  large  agreement  in  the  theoretical  literature  that  these  subsidies  should  be 
effective, there is relatively little empirical research that has examined the effectiveness of the 
(employer-side) wage subsidies. This is in a marked contrast to a large  literature  that has 
examined the effects of the targeted tax cuts for employees.
2 
3 One reason for the lack of 
research is that low-wage subsidies, in the form of targeted cuts to employers’ social security 
contributions, have not been implemented in practice in many countries.  
The purpose of this paper is to offer new evidence on the causal effects of low-wage subsidies 
by examining the impacts of a highly targeted low-wage subsidy experiment that started in 
Finland in 2006. The design of the Finnish low-wage subsidy scheme makes evaluating its 
impacts relatively straightforward. In order to be eligible for the subsidy, the workers must be 
over 54 years of age, earn a salary between 900 and 2,000 euros per month and work full 
time. This means that we can find several comparison groups for the targeted workers, thus 
allowing a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) approach. We can simultaneously 
control for any permanent differences across the eligible and ineligible groups and take into 
account  time-varying  differences  in  labour  demand  for  different  skill  groups.  The  latter, 
particularly, may be quite important if skill-biased technical change or globalisation changes 
the relative productivity of different workers.  
                                                 
1 See Phelps (1994, 1997) and Dreze and Malinvaud (1994) 
2 See Eissa and Liebman (1996) and Eissa and Hoynes (2004) who examine the effects of the Earned Income 
Tax Credit in the US case and Blundell et al. 2006 for the UK evidence on the effectveness of Working Families 
Tax Credit (WFTC) or Card and Hyslop (2005) for experimental evidence on effectiveness of Self Suffiency 
Project. Kramarz and Philippon (2001) and Crepon and Desplatz (2003) evaluate the French low-wage subsidy 
system. All this literature is discussed in more detail in Section 2. 
3 There is also large literature which focused on hiring subsidies that are directed to unemployed workers.  
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The empirical analysis in the paper has many phases and utilises several different data sets. 
We begin by looking at the overall impacts of the subsidy system on the employment rates 
using data from the Finnish Labour Force Survey. In the following part we use register data of 
the unemployed and examine in detail whether the subsidy system increased re-employment 
rates of the unemployed. In the last part we use data that cover all workers in firms that are 
members of the Finnish Employers’ Confederation. The benefit of these  data is that they 
contain detailed information about the working hours and monthly wages of the workers that 
determine eligibility  for the subsidy.  This enables us  to build  a clearly defined treatment 
group and corresponding control. We examine the impacts of the subsidy system on the job 
leaving rate, as well as working hours and wages of those workers who keep their jobs. 
This paper contributes to the literature in many ways. First, as mentioned already, the clear 
eligibility criteria of the Finnish low-wage subsidy experiment makes it possible to examine 
the  effects  of  a  low-wage subsidy  on target-group  employment,  while  controlling  for  the 
simultaneous changes that affect the demand for all low-wage worker or all older workers. 
Second, this paper adds to the relatively scarce literature that has examined the effects of low-
wage subsidies on employment and it is the first that uses data from a Nordic country. Finland 
is a good case for analysing the effectiveness of payroll tax subsidies. Union contracts have 
led to a relatively narrow wage distribution which could have contributed to the gap in the 
unemployment rates between low-skilled and high-skilled workers that is among the largest in 
Europe, according to the Eurostat Labour Force Survey. Finally, since the subsidy scheme 
was targeted to older workers, our results also provide new evidence on the effectiveness of 
policies that aim to increase the demand for older workers.   
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews earlier relevant empirical work.
4 Section 3 
explains the Finnish subsidy system in more detail. In section 4 we look at the trends in the 
employment rates of workers in different age  groups using data from  the Finnish Labour 
Force Survey. In section 5, we use register-data of the unemployed and examine in detail 
whether the subsidy system affected re-employment rates of unemployed. In Section 6 we 
examine the impacts of the subsidy system on the job leaving rate, as well as working hours 
and  wages  of  those  workers  who  keep  their  jobs  using  data  of  the  Finnish  Employers’ 
Confederation. Finally, section 7 discusses results from a number of extensions to the analysis 
above. Section 8 concludes. 
                                                 
4 For the sake of space, we do not cover the theoretical literature on payroll tax subsidies here. Brown et al. 
(2007) contains an extensive list of theoretical work in the area.  
  3   
2. Earlier empirical work 
 
The  best-known  scheme  aiming  at  promoting  low-wage  employment  with  subsidies  to 
employers was implemented in France, where payroll taxes were reduced for the low-wage 
workers several times in mid 1990’s. The main difference between the Finnish and the French 
subsidy schemes is that the French subsidy affects all low-wage workers, while the Finnish 
subsidy is targeted at older low-wage workers. The evaluation of French scheme is thus more 
difficult, since it is hard to distinguish between the employment effects that are due to the 
subsidy from the simultaneous changes affecting all low-wage workers
5. 
Employment  effects  of  the  French  payroll  tax  subsidy  scheme  have  been  evaluated  by 
Kramarz and Philippon (2001) and Crepon and Desplatz (2003). Kramarz and Philippon base 
their evaluation on household survey data and examine the effects of changes in the minimum 
labour costs - hence  capturing the effects of both the changes in minimum  wage and the 
changes in payroll tax subsidies at the minimum wage level. By comparing workers affected 
by the minimum wage increases with workers just above the new minimum wage, they show 
that increases in labour costs increase transitions to non-employment. However, their analysis 
regarding the effects of a decrease in the labour costs due to an increase in the payroll tax 
subsidy reveals no significant employment effects. The authors measure this as an increase in 
minimum-wage workers coming from non-employment. 
Crepon and Desplatz (2003) perform their analysis with firm-level employment as the key 
dependent variable. They calculate the ex-ante change in labour costs due to the payroll tax 
subsidies, using payroll tax parameters and the composition of the firm’s labour force before 
the introduction of the payroll tax changes. They find that employment in firms that received 
larger subsidies grew more than employment in firms that employed fewer low-wage workers 
and  hence received  fewer subsidies. The authors interpret  this as strong evidence  for  the 
employment effects of low-wage subsidies. Since the outcome variable is total employment, 
the authors cannot discover whether the increase in employment occurs in the targeted low-
wage  group  or  whether  the  increase  in  employment  is  due  to  an  increase  in  high-wage 
workers.   
                                                 
5 The Finnish and French subsidy systems are roughly similar in magnitude, but the Finnish subsidy is phased 
out more slowly and hence has an impact on labour costs at much higher wage levels.  
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Targeted payroll tax subsidies have also existed in the Netherlands and in Belgium. Goos and 
Konings (2007) evaluate the effects of changes occurring in the ‘Maribel subsidies’ system in 
Belgium in the late 1990s using firm-level data. These subsidies reduced the payroll taxes 
paid  on  manual  workers.  Even  though  the  subsidy  was  not  specifically  targeted  to  the 
employers of low-wage workers, its lump-sum structure reduced the payroll taxes for the low-
wage workers more than for the other groups. Goos and Konings find that the subsidy had 
significant effects on employment
6. 
The  subsidies  discussed  above  involve  a  decrease  in  the  payroll  taxes  of  the  subsidized 
workers. Gruber (1994) analyses the effect of a reverse experiment, increasing the costs of 
hiring  certain  groups  by  increasing  mandatory  employer  contributions.  He  examines  the 
effects of forcing employers to purchase health insurance that includes maternity benefits, a 
change  mainly  affecting  young  women.  He  shows  that  the  costs  of  these  group-specific 
mandates are mainly borne by workers in terms of lower wages and that the additional costs 
have little effects on employment. 
While  permanent  non-categorical  subsidies to  all employers  of the  low-wage  workers  are 
rather  rare,  there  is  a  large  literature  evaluating  the  effects  of  temporary  subsidies  to 
employers  who  hire  long-term unemployed  persons or workers  with disabilities. Many of 
these programs have been evaluated using randomised trials. In his comprehensive survey of 
the US programs Katz (1996) concludes that wage subsidies have been effective in improving 
the earnings and employment of disadvantaged groups, at least when combined with training 
elements. More recent evidence is available from Britain, where the so-called ‘New Deal’ 




As discussed in the introduction, an alternative to employer-based subsidies is to target the 
subsidy to employees. This is the way in which the Earned Income Tax Credit in the US and 
the Working Families Tax Credit in the UK are designed. There exits a large literature that 
                                                 
6 We are not aware of the econometric evaluations of the Dutch system, but Bovenberg et al. (2000) evaluate its 
effects using a simulation model calibrated to Dutch data. Their conclusion is that the most effective way of 
reducing unemployment is the introduction of in-work benefits, though the simulation results between the 
benefits paid to the low-wage workers or to the employers of these workers are roughly similar. 
7 See also Gesine (2009) that focuses on the wage effects of hiring subsidies. His paper also includes an 
extensive survey of the empirical work on hiring subsidies.  
8 There is also literature on the effects of payroll tax reductions that affected all employees (Gruber, 1997), or all 
employees in some regions (Korkeamäki and Uusitalo, 2009 and Bennmarker et al., 2009). 
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examines  the  effectiveness  of  employee-base  subsidies.  Despite  the  different  nominal 
recipients, there are also similarities that make the results from the evaluation of these subsidy 
schemes relevant for the Finnish case. All these schemes share the property that the subsidy is 
targeted to  the  low-wage  workers  and  that the  subsidy gradually decreases after earnings 
increase above some threshold level. They are also intended to be permanent subsidies for the 
low-wage workers instead of temporary subsidies for the newly hired. Importantly for the 
evaluation, these schemes also have other eligibility criteria in addition to low earnings. This 
allows comparing wage and employment changes after the introduction or expansion of the 
subsidy in the eligible group and in some comparison group that is in a reasonably similar 
position in the labour market. Using this strategy, Eissa and Liebman (1996) and Blundell 
(2006) compare the changes in labour supply between single mothers and (ineligible) single 
women without children. Both of these studies find substantial effects on the labour supply
9.  
 
  3. The Finnish employer low-wage subsidy scheme 
 
Since  January  1
st 2006  Finnish  employers  have  been  eligible for  a  wage  subsidy  if they 
employ a low-wage worker that is over 54 years old. The subsidy-scheme is temporary and 
will be in force until December 2010.
10 The subsidy depends on the wage level and may be up 
to 16 per cent of the gross wage or 13 per cent of the total pre-reform labour costs including 
payroll taxes. 
The subsidy covers full-time workers who are employed at least 140 hours per month and 
whose wage is between 900 and 2,000 euros per month. The subsidy equals 44 per cent of the 
part of the monthly wages that exceeds 900 euros. The maximum subsidy per employee is 220 
euros a month. The amount of the subsidy is reduced by 55 per cent of the monthly wages 
exceeding 1,600 euros.  
The wage subsidy is paid to the employer and can be seen as simply a reduction in the payroll 
tax rate for the firms that employ old low-wage workers. In 2006 the average payroll tax rate 
                                                 
9 Card and Hyslop (2005) provide experimental evidence on the effectiveness employee-based wage subsidies. 
They evaluate Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project, which gave randomly chosen welfare recipients a subsidy for 
full-time work for 3 years. The results indicate that the subsidy had a clear negative- although temporary- effect 
on welfare participation.   
10 Whether the system will be continued will depend on its effectiveness during the experimental period. Since 
the experiment will be quite long, it is reasonable to believe that firms can react to it and therefore the evaluation 
of this system will also reveal relevant information for a truly permanent scheme.   
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was 20.9 per cent of the gross wage. The tax is levied on all wages. The revenues are mainly 
used for funding the employee’s pension system and the sickness insurance. The tax rate is 
slightly higher for larger and more capital-intensive firms. For large firms, pension payments 
also vary according to the age structure of the employees and according to the disability and 
unemployment pensions granted to former employees. Still, even for large firms the payroll 
tax is a proportional tax on all wages paid.  
The 2006 tax subsidy created a system where the payroll tax rate is a decreasing function of 
monthly wages when wages are between 900 and 1,400 euros. The payroll-tax rate is at its 
minimum (5.2%) when the monthly wage equals 1,400€. When wages are between 1,400 and 
1,600 euros, firms get the maximum subsidy of 220 euros. The subsidy is gradually reduced 
when wages increase above 1,600 euros so that the subsidy reaches zero when the monthly 
wage equals 2,000 euros. In this phase-out range the payroll taxes are strongly progressive 
with tax rates increasing from 7.2 % at the wage level of 1,600 €/month to roughly 21% at the 
wage  level of 2,000 €/month. Figure 1 illustrates the  effects of the  low-wage  subsidy by 
plotting the reduction in the payroll tax due to the  system and the corresponding average 
payroll tax rate.  
Finland has no minimum wage laws. However, union contracts also cover non-union workers 
so that in practice the lowest legal wages are set in the union contracts for about 95 per cent of 
the workers. In the union contracts, the lowest wages vary across sectors, regions and tasks. In 
typical low-wage sector contracts, the lowest full-time wages were around 1,300 in 2006. In 
comparison one could note that according to Statistics Finland the average wage for full-time 
workers was around 2,500 euros in 2006. The subsidy is therefore targeted at workers that are 
well below the average wage, with the maximum subsidy paid to those whose wage is close to 
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Payroll tax rate Payroll tax reduction
   
Notes: The payroll tax reduction due to the Finnish low-wage subsidy system (right axis) and the corresponding 
average payroll tax rate (left axis), when the payroll tax without a subsidy is a proportional 21% tax. 
Since most full-time workers earn more  than 1,400€/month, the subsidy both lowered the 
average payroll tax rate of target group workers, and made the payroll tax more progressive. 
The  effects  of  progressivity  on  wages  and  employment  crucially  depend on  whether  the 
labour  market  is  competitive  or  not.  In  competitive  labour  markets,  an  increase  in 
progressivity typically reduces labour  supply,  whereas  in an  imperfect  labour  market,  the 
opposite  may  hold.  For  example,  in  union  models,  a  revenue-neutral  increase  in  tax 
progressivity  can  increase  employment,  since  it  renders  nominal  wage  increases  less 
profitable for the unions, tilting the balance between employment and high wages in favour of 
increased employment (see e.g. Lockwood and Manning 1993, Holmlund and Kolm 1995 and 
Koskela  and  Vilmunen  1996).  This  is  a  relatively  robust  result  that  has  garnered  some 
empirical support, and it also holds under different labour-market imperfections (see e.g. the 
discussion in Sørensen 1997).   
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However, the mirror image of this result is that gross wages for low-paid workers may rise 
less  than  they  would  have  risen  in  the  absence  of  the  progressive  payroll  tax  system.
11 
Second, even if a rise in tax progressivity may increase employment at the extensive margin 
(i.e. the number of employees), it can still reduce the hours of work or, more generally, effort 
by individual workers at the intensive margin.
12 Therefore, it is also important to account for 
how the hours that are worked change because of the reform. 
 
  4. Employment rates by age 
As a first attempt to assess the employment effects of the wage subsidies we use data from the 
Finnish  Labour  Force  Survey.  We  do  not  have  micro-data  at  our  disposal  but  we  used 
employment rates and average hours per employed worker both calculated for one-year age 
groups.  These  data  are unpublished tables  produced for  internal  use  at  Statistics  Finland. 
Statistical publications report similar numbers aggregated to five-year age groups. 
We use data on employment rates and hours per employee for one-year age-groups between 
ages 46 and 60 from the period 2001 – 2007 and specify a simple difference-in-differences 
model that captures differences in employment rates across age groups and general trends in 
the  labour markets. The effect of the  subsidy scheme  is  captured by an  interaction term, 
SUBSIDYit, indicating that the subsidy system has been implemented (year ≥ 2006) and that 
the age-group is eligible for the subsidy (age ≥ 54). The equation to be estimated is therefore  
it t t i i it it ε + ) D(year Φ + ) D(age Ω + β + α = y SUBSIDY ,  (1) 
where yit is the variable of interest i.e. the employment rate or average hours of age group i in 
year t. The coefficient β is an unbiased estimate of eligibility for the subsidy if there are no 
other age-specific trends that are correlated with the subsidy scheme. As can be seen from 
Figure 2 this assumption is likely to be violated. Employment rates for the older age groups 
had been increasing for several years before the introduction of wage subsidies for reasons 
clearly unrelated to the subsidy scheme. To avoid interpreting these changes as an effect of 
                                                 
11 This is, in fact, what some unions, where a large proportion of members are in the low-wage area, feared and 
therefore they opposed the introduction of the low-wage subsidy system. 
12 This point had already been examined by Jackman and Layard (1990). In the long term, tax progressivity can 
also reduce the incentives to acquire education.  
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wage subsidies for workers over 54, we add age-specific linear trends to the equations that we 
estimate. 








2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
46-49 50-53 54-57 58-60
 
The results are displayed in Table 1. We first report the effect of the subsidy on employment 
rates and then hours and per employee. The first two columns include both men and women. 
The next columns report the results for men and women separately. All equations include a 
full set of age and year dummies; coefficients of these dummy-variables are not reported in 
the table.   
The  estimates  are  reported  in  Columns  1,  3,  and  5  indicate  that  the  difference  in  the 
employment rates before and after the introduction of the subsidy system is on average 2.8 
percentage points higher in the age groups eligible for the subsidy than in the younger age 
groups. Also, hours per employed worker seem to have increased by 21.9 hours per year or by 
about 1.4 percent. However, both these changes seem to  be due to a  general increase in 
employment in the older age groups. After adding cohort-specific trends to the equations the 
estimated effects decrease close to zero and are not significant in any specification.   
If the employment rates of the older age groups had increased after the reform we should have 
been able  to detect  them  by  using  data  from  the Labour  Force  Survey.  Focusing  on  the 
employment rates instead of the number of employed workers also captures the changes in the 
cohort size effectively controlling for the changes in the labour supply. The drawback to the  
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Labour Force Survey is that information on wages or education is not available. Hence, we 
could not capture differential changes in low-wage and high-wage employment. This is why 
we  now  proceed  to  triple  differences  (DDD)  analysis,  first  in  Section  5,  on  exit  from 
unemployment using register-data of the unemployed and, second in Section 6, on job leaving 
rates, hours of work and wage rates using data from the employers’ organisation.  
 
Table 1. Difference-in-differences estimates on employment rates. 
 
Employment rate  All  Men  Women 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
             
Subsidy  0.028***  -0.006  0.021**  -0.006  0.035***  -0.008 
  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.009)  (0.011) 
Year effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Age effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Age-specific trends    yes    yes    yes 
N  105  105  105  105  105  105 
Adj R
2  0.98  0.99  0.96  0.97  0.97  0.99 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
           
   
Hours  All  Men  Women 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
             
Subsidy  21.9**  -7.8  26.4  -11.2  20.9  0.2 
  (14.1)  (21.7)  (22.1)  (35.6)  (15.1)  (24.4) 
Year effects  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes 
Age effects  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes 
Age-specific trends    yes    yes    yes 
N  105  105  105  105  105  105 
Adj R
2  0.87  0.88  0.71  0.72  0.86  0.86 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
           
   
Log hours  All  Men  Women 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
             
Subsidy  0.014  -0.004  0.015  -0.006  0.014  0.001 
  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.020)  (0.010)  (0.016) 
Year effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Age effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Age-specific trends    yes    yes    yes 
N  105  105  105  105  105  105 
Adj R
2  0.87  0.88  0.71  0.72  0.86  0.86 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
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  5. Entry of the unemployed to the workforce 
 
We analyse the effect of the subsidy on re-employment rates using individual-level data from 
Finnish Longitudinal Census files. The data contains a 33% random sample of population that 
resided in Finland at some point between 1990 and 2006 and hence also a random sample of 
the unemployed at any given point in time. We take three separate cross-sections of data 
containing those who were unemployed in the last week of the years 2003, 2004 and 2005 and 
examine their employment status in the end of the following year. To focus on the elderly 
unemployed we limit the data to those between the ages of 45 and 59 at the time when we 
draw the samples i.e between 46 and 60 when we measure their labor market outcomes. The 
unemployed in the first two cross-sections are not eligible for the subsidy but those who were 
unemployed in the end of 2005 become eligible from the beginning of 2006 if they are over 
54 years old in 2006. 
 
We define the treatment group as those who are eligible for the subsidy, i.e. those whose 
monthly wages are less than 2,000 EUR and who are over 54 years old. Since wages for the 
unemployed are not available, we cannot create treatment and control groups based on the 
current wage level. As a partial solution we split the data by education into those with no 
more than basic education and those with at least a secondary education; and by previous 
wage into those whose pre-unemployment monthly wage was below 2,000 EUR and those 
whose pre-unemployment wage was higher than that. Pre-unemployment wages are based on 
months worked and annual income received during the previous  year. To avoid excessive 
measurement errors  we only included data on those who had worked  at least six months 
during the calendar year. Since many unemployed workers have incomplete earnings histories 
we could calculate reliable pre-unemployment wages for only about half of the sample. We 
have thus two alternative treatment groups in this section: The 54-60 -year-old workers whose 
pre-employment monthly wages were below 2,000 EUR or the 54-60 -year-old workers who 
have  no  more  than  basic  education.  Workers  who  are  younger  than  54  or  whose  pre-
employment monthly wages were above 2,000 EUR (or who have more than basic education) 
are used as control group. 
 
We  begin  by  estimating  the  effect  of  low  wage  subsidy  on  re-employment  rates  of 
unemployed workers. The estimated equation has the following form:  
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) WAGEG AGEG (YEAR β + ) WAGEG (YEAR β + ) AGEG (YEAR β +
) WAGEG (AGEG β + WAGEG β + AGEG β + YEAR β + X β + α = ) = E | = P(E
t i i t 8 t i t 7 i t 6
t i i 5 t i 4 i 3 t 2 it 1 it it
1 , 1 ,
1 , 1 , 1 0 1
- -
- - -
* * * *
*
 (2) 
In  this  equation  i  indexes  individuals,  t  indexes  years  and  ) = E | = P(E it it 0 1 1 -   is  the 
probability that an unemployed worker finds employment between t-1 and t.  it X  is a vector of 
individual characteristics, YEAR controls for common time shocks, AGEG is an age group 
dummy,  which  controls  for  permanent  differences  between  older  and  younger  workers, 
WAGEG is a wage group dummy (based on previous earnings or education level), which 
controls for permanent differences between low-wage (low-skill) and high-wage (high-skill) 
workers, AGEG*WAGEG controls for time-invariant characteristics of the treatment group, 
YEAR*AGEG controls for the time-specific shocks that affect the outcome of older workers, 
and YEAR*WAGEG captures the time-specific shocks common to low-wage (or low-skill) 
workers. The third level interaction term ( 8 β ) captures all variations in the outcome specific 
to older low-wage (or low-skilled) workers after the introduction of the low-wage subsidy 
scheme. This is the “difference-in-difference-in-differences” (DDD) estimator. Its identifying 
assumption is that there is no contemporaneous shock that affects the relative outcomes of the 
treatment group differently than other older workers or other low-wage (low-skill) workers. 
Table 2 presents the main results of the exercise. First, in Column 1 we presents difference-in-
difference-in-differences estimates i.e. the coefficient of a triple interaction between the post-
reform period, age over 54 and only compulsory education while controlling for the pair-wise 
interactions  between  these  variables.  The  coefficient  is  positive,  indicating  that  the  re-
employment  rates  of  the  unemployed  that  are  more  likely  to  be  eligible  for  the  subsidy 
increase  by  one  per  cent  due  to  the  reform.  However,  this  estimate  is  not  statistically 
significant. In the second column we use an indicator of previous wages that are below 2,000 
euro instead of an indicator of low education. Since data on previous wages is missing for 
many observations the sample size is dramatically reduced. The estimate is larger than in the 
previous  column  but  still  insignificantly  different  from  zero.  In  Column  3  we  limit  the 
comparison group to those whose previous monthly wage is below 3,000 euro and in Column 
4 exclude the unemployed who are 55 because their early retirement benefits changed in 2005 
in a way that is likely to increase re-employment incentives. Neither has much effect on the 
estimates.
13     
                                                 
13 An earlier decided pension reform came into force during the same time, affecting the early retirement 
incentives of all 55 year olds (not only low-income older workers).   
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Table 2. The effect of the subsidy on re-employment rates. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
older*low educ*after  0.011 
(0.010) 
     
older*low.prev.wage*after 
 






  126625  48049  43200  39942 
  0.037  (0.046)  0.040  0.044 
      Wage 
<3000 
Wage<3000 
& Age ≠ 55 
The dependent variable is a binary indicator that an unemployed person is re-employed at the end of the 
following year. Sample average 0.28. The sample consists of workers who were 45-59 and unemployed at the 
end of year t-1. Standard errors are in parentheses. All specification include controls for age, age and year 
interactions, gender. Specification 1 has also control for low education, low education*year, low 
education*older. Specifications 2-4 control also for low prev. wage, low prev. wage*year, low prev. wage* 
older. 
 
  6. The impact of the low-wage subsidy on job exit rates, wages and working 
hours 
 
In this section we examine the impact of the low-wage subsidy scheme on the probability of 
exiting  from  current  employment.  As  entry  into  new  jobs  is  relatively  rare  at  old  ages, 
reducing  exits  could  be  a  key  channel  to  how  the  subsidy  could  affect  employment.  In 
addition we examine the effect of low-wage subsidy on wages and working hours. 
 
The data for this section come from the payroll records of the Finnish employers’ association. 
The data cover all private sector workers except the firm’s top management in firms that are 
members of the association and provide information about monthly wages, working time, and 
some information about workers’ individual characteristics such as age, gender and education. 
The data contains pseudo ID codes identifying each person and each firm that allow the same 
person to be followed over time as long as the person remains employed by a firm that is 
included in the data. In addition, we have access to register data from the tax authorities that 
includes the actual subsidies paid to all individuals in Finland.  
The main benefit of the data is that wages are accurately reported. In most firms the wage data 
comes directly from the firm’s pay system. Hours are also reported accurately in the firms that 
pay hourly wages. The firms that pay monthly salaries typically only report normal weekly 
hours.  Even  this  information  is  likely  to  be  more  reliable  than  self-reported  hours  in 
household surveys.  
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The sample that we use in the empirical analysis is constructed as follows. We have two years 
of data before the reform (2004 and 2005) and two years after the reform (2006 and 2007). 
We drew  four separate samples: for each year; we take those employed at the end of the 
previous year (t-1) and follow them until the end of year t. To limit the comparison group to 
reasonably similar workers we restricted both samples to those over 45 and below 59 years at 
the time when the wage information was collected (time t-1). In addition, we only consider 
employees whose wage is less than 3,000 € per month. 
We determine eligibility for the subsidy based on age and monthly wage in  year t-1, and 
calculate the subsidy based on monthly wage in that year. We begin by dividing the data into 
two age groups (below 54/above 54) and two wage groups (below 2,000/above 2,000).  We 
thus have four different age-wage categories. Our treatment group is the workers who are 
eligible  for  the  subsidy,  i.e.  older  low-wage  workers.  Notice  that  we  do  not  restrict  the 
treatment group to full-time workers. If we did this, we would not capture the possibility that 
a  part-time  worker  could  become  a  full-time  worker  because  of  the  introduction  of  the 
subsidy.
14 
Table 3 collects some descriptive analysis of the target and the control group in the post- 
reform years, 2006 and 2007. Most eligible workers work in the service sector. The share of 
female workers in the treatment group is higher than their average share in both sectors. Not 
surprisingly, workers in the treatment group are also less educated than other workers. The 
mean wage in the eligible group is at the phase-out range of the subsidy, suggesting that most 
of the employers of the target group workers face a progressive payroll tax system. 
The table also reports the share of those who actually received the subsidy among the eligible.  
The take-up rate is calculated as the share of those who actually received the benefit in year t 
according to data from the Tax Register to those who would eligible for the benefit according 
to  the  wage  and  the  working  hours  reported  in  the  employers’  association  data.  Not  all 
employers of the eligible used the subsidy. The take-up rate is 64% in the service sector and 
56% in the industrial sector.
15 
16  
                                                 
14 On the other hand, the treatment group now includes part-time workers who are not eligible for the subsidy. 
We also analysed the case where the treatment group was restricted to full-time workers. See the discussion at 
the end of Section 6. 
15 Analysis of the take-up rate reveals that take-up is higher in bigger firms and in firms where the mean wage is 
smaller than the average.  Representatives of the federations of industries and entrepreneurs have suggested that  
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics from payroll data.  
 
  Service sector  Industrial sector 
  Eligible*  Others  Eligible*  Others 
Obs  17159  87146  13332  105573 
Female  0.87  0.81  0.55  0.25 
Basic edu  0.45  0.23  0.55  0.37 
Secondary edu  0.46  0.42  0.40  0.59 
Academic edu  0.10  0.36  0.04  0.04 
Age at t-1  55.81  50.79  55.81  51.29 
Wage at t-1  1724  2221  1702  2359 
Fulltime at t-1  0.90  0.96  0.82  0.99 
Take-up rate **  0.64    0.56   
Subsidy **  66.71    142.11   
 
*Eligibility is defined as having a wage between 900-2000 euros a month in year t-1 and being over 53 years old 
in year t-1. **Mean monthly value of the subsidy in year t for those who received any subsidy. This table was 
prepared using only (post reform) years 2006 and 2007. The take-up rates are calculated using actual realised 
wages and working hours (unlike in regressions where eligibility is determined on the basis of wages at the 
previous period, without working hours restrictions). 
 
We begin by estimating the effect of the low-wage subsidy on the job exit rate. We defined 
those who were not found in the same firm the next year as leavers. As previously we use the 
difference-in-difference-in-differences strategy. The regression equation has a form similar to 
Equation (2) in Section 5: 
) WAGEG AGEG (YEAR β + ) WAGEG (YEAR β + ) AGEG (YEAR β +
) WAGEG (AGEG β + WAGEG β + AGEG β + YEAR β + X β + α = ) = E | = P(E
t i i t 8 t i t 7 i t 6
t i i 5 t i 4 i 3 t 2 it 1 it it
1 , 1 ,
1 , 1 , 1 1 0 1
- -
- - - -
* * * *
*
(3) 
In this equation  ) = E | = P(E it it 1 0 1 -  is the probability that a worker leaves a firm between t-1 
and t. The WAGEG variable is now an indicator variable that gets value one if the monthly 
wages  in  year  t-1  were  below  2,000  EUR.  As  explained  in  section  5,  this  specification 
controls for any permanent differences between treatment and control groups as well as any 
simultaneous changes affecting employment of all older workers or employment of all low-
wage  workers  at  the  time  when  the  low-wage  subsidy  was  introduced.  The  third  level 
                                                                                                                                                      
cumbersome administrative details related to the subsidy system may explain why some firms have not applied 
for the subsidies.  
16 In our analysis eligibility is defined using the previous year’s earnings and age, and thus the share of workers 
who actually received the subsidy is even lower than when measured by current earnings and working hours in 
the year when subsidy scheme was at place. The take-up rate for the eligible in this set up is 0.42 in the industrial 
sector and 0.52 in the service sector. Some people in the non-eligible group also received the subsidy, the share 
is 0.02 for the service sector and 0.01 for the  industrial sector.  
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interaction term ( 8 β ) captures all variations in outcome specific to older low-wage workers 
after the introduction of the low-wage subsidy scheme.  
We  also  estimate  a  specification  where  we  replaced  the  treatment-dummy  variable 
WAGEG) AGEG (YEARt * *  with the amount of the subsidy the employer would be eligible 
for. Now the effect of the subsidy is also identified from the differences in the size of the 
subsidy among the eligible group. Since the size of the subsidy depends on the wage level we 
replace the rough low-wage high-wage groups with finer 100 euro wage intervals. At the 
same time we fully control for age by including it as one-year age dummies.  
We calculated the  low-wage subsidy that the firm  would get for each worker  in year t if 
his/her wage remained unchanged from year t-1. Since the payroll tax subsidy was introduced 
only in 2006, this measure is zero for all workers in the 2003 and 2004 samples. For the 2005 
sample the measure gets positive values if the 2005 wage is below 2,000 euros and if the 
worker is over 53 (i.e. over 54 and hence eligible in 2006), and likewise for the 2006 sample.  
Our model is therefore identified from the differences in the changes in  job-leaving rates 
between the group that becomes eligible for the low-wage subsidies and groups that are either 
too young to be eligible or have a wage exceeding 2,000 euro. In both cases we estimate the 
impacts of the eligibility for the low-wage subsidy, not the effect of actually receiving the 
subsidy. As we report in the empirical section, the take-up rates were well below 100 per cent, 
indicating that not all firms that are eligible for the subsidy ever apply for it
17.   
We use a similar specification when we examine the effects on hours and wages conditional 
on employment. In this analysis of adjustment in the intensive margin we limit the data to 
those who are employed in the same firm in both years t-1 and t. The dependent variable is 
either log hourly wages or log weekly hours. 
Table 4 illustrates a DDD estimation of the effect of low-wage subsidy on job-leaving rates 
for the industrial sector. The upper panel compares the change in job exit rates for older low-
wage  workers  (treatment  individuals)  before  and  after  the  introduction  of  the  low-wage 
subsidy scheme with the change in the job exit rates of younger low-wage workers. Each cell 
contains the mean job-leaving rate for the group labelled on the axes, along with standard 
errors and the number of observations. There is a clear fall in the job-leaving rates for both 
groups during this period.  The difference-in-differences estimate, i.e. the difference in the 
                                                 
17  Our results should therefore be interpreted as effects of eligibility, or intention to treat effect.    
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changes of the job-leaving rate between older and younger low-wage workers is -2.5 per cent. 
If there was a distinct labour market shock that affected older workers over this period, this 
estimate would  not correctly  identify the impact of the low-wage subsidy scheme. In the 
bottom panel we perform the same exercise for high-wage workers. The difference between 
the change in the job-leaving rate for older and younger high-wage workers is also negative, -
2.1 per cent. Taking the difference between these two panels, we get the DDD estimate, which 
is negative but not statistically significant.  
In the lower panel we perform the same exercise for service sector workers. The DD between 
older and younger low-wage workers indicates a 2.2 per cent fall in the job-leaving rate. This 
difference is similar for high-wage workers (2.5 per cent). According to the lower panel, the 
DDD estimate indicates that there was no change in the job-leaving rate of the target group. 
The  results  in  this  table  demonstrate  the  power  and  importance  of  the  DDD  estimation. 
Without the other control group, one would mistakenly conclude that the subsidy system was 
effective in reducing exit rates. 
The first row of Table 5 presents the results of the same analysis in a regression framework. 
We  first  re-report  the  coefficient of  the treatment  variable  (older*low-wage*after)  in  our 
DDD specification for industrial sector workers. We estimate this linear probability model by 
OLS. In Column 2 we control for other observables, such as educational category (4), gender, 
union contract, and two-digit industry. Adding these control variables does not render the 
coefficient significant. 
The lower panel reports the results of a specification where we explain the job-leaving rate by 
the  amount  of  the  subsidy  the  worker’s  employer  is  eligible  for  (in  100  euro).  The 
specification in the first column includes controls for age-group, wage-group and time period. 
In the next column we report the results for a specification which controls for time-specific 
shocks to age- and wage-groups, as well as age-group wage-group interaction. Now we find 
that even if we take into account the actual amount of the subsidy the employers could be 
eligible for, the system is still not effective in reducing exit rates. The result remains when 
controls for gender, education and industry are included.  
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Table 4.  DDD Estimates of the impact of low-wage subsidy on exit rate. 
 
    Industrial sector 
Wage < 2000         
  before  after  difference  diff-in-diff 
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  Before  after  difference  diff-in-diff 





















      DDD:  .003 
(.008) 
Each cell contains mean exit rate (job leaving rate between t-1 and t) for the group identified. Standard errors are 
given in parentheses; sample sizes are given in square brackets. Sample consist of 45-59 years old workers in 
year t-1.  
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Columns  3  and  4  report  the  same  estimations  for  service-sector  workers.  The  additional 
control variables include dummies for gender, educational category and educational field. The 
results indicate that subsidy scheme had not impact on job leaving rate.  
Since a simultaneous pension reform made it easier for 55-year–old workers to leave to early-
retirement, we have checked the robustness of the results when this age group is dropped from 
the  sample.  The  qualitative  results  remain  the  same:  the  exit  rates  did  not  decline  in  a 
statistically significant way in either sector.
18 
Table 5. Effect of low wage subsidy on job-leaving rates (DDD estimates). 
 
  Industrial sector  Service sector 
Specification I  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Treat*after  -0.004  -0.002  0.003  0.001 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Controls    x    x 
Observations  243364  243364  187493  187493 
R-squared  0.00  0.03  0.02  0.02 
Specification II  (1)  (2)     
Amount of subsidy/100  0.003  0.004  0.005  0.004 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Controls    x    x 
Observations  243364  243364  187493  187493 
R-squared  0.01  0.04  0.04  0.04 
Dependent variable: worker exits firm between t-1 and t. The sample consists of workers who were 45-59 years 
old whose earnings were between 900 and 3000 euros in year t-1. The upper panel reports the coefficient on the 
third level interaction (older*low-wage*after) of equation (2). In all columns other controls are dummies for 
older, low-wage, (older*low-wage), after and (older*after) and (low-wage*after) interactions.  The additional 
controls for industrial sector (column 2) include educational category (4), gender, union contract, and two-digit 
industry and for service sector (column 4) gender, educational category and educational field. The lower panel 
reports the coefficient of amount of subsidy (in 100 euros). In all columns the controls include age dummies, 
wage group dummies (by 100 euros), wageg*after, ageg*after, and ageg*wageg interactions.  Columns 2 and 4 
include also additional controls reported above. Standard errors in parentheses.* significant at 5%; ** significant 
at 1%. 
 
Next, we analyse how low-wage subsidies affected working hours and earnings for those who 
remained with their employer. Table 6 reports the OLS estimates of the third-level interaction 
from equation (1), where the dependent variable is now the log weekly working hours.  From 
the upper panel, we find that the introduction of the wage subsidy increased the working 
hours for older  workers  in the  industrial sector  by  almost 4.5  per  cent.  The  lower  panel 
suggests, however, that when measured by the actual amount of the subsidy the employers are 
eligible for, the impact on working hours decreases to 1.8 per cent. There are probably some 
                                                 
18 These results are available from the authors upon request.  
  20   
non-linear effects on working hours, depending on the workers’ wage level. There seems to 
be no effect of the low-wage subsidy for service-sector workers. We also investigated whether 
this increase in working hours was due to a possible increase in the share of full-time workers 
within the group of older low-wage workers. Our results (not reported) indicated that the low-
wage subsidy did, in fact, significantly increase the likelihood of becoming a full-time worker 
for part-time workers in the industrial sector
19.  
Table 6. Effect of low-wage subsidy on working hours for stayers (DDD estimates). 
 
  Industrial sector  Service sector 
Specification I  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Treat*after  0.045  0.046  0.002  0.001 
  (0.005)**  (0.005)**  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Controls    x    x 
Observations  196112  196112  151078  151078 
R-squared  0.11  0.15  0.03  0.05 
Specification II  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Amount of subsidy  0.018  0.016  0.000  0.000 
  (0.004)**  (0.004)**  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Controls    x     
Observations  196112  196112  151078  151078 
R-squared  0.33  0.35  0.10  0.11 
Dependent variable: log. weekly working hours at t. The sample consists of workers who were 45-59 years old 
whose earnings were between 900 and 3000 euros in year t-1 and who remained with their employer until the 
end of year t. The upper panel reports the coefficient on the third level interaction (older*low-wage*after) of 
equation (3). In all columns controls include dummies for older, low-wage, (older*low-wage), after and 
(older*after) and (low-wage*after) interactions. The additional controls for industrial sector (column 2) include 
educational category (4), gender, union contract, and two-digit industry and for service sector (column 4) gender, 
educational category and educational field. The lower panel reports the coefficient of amount of subsidy (in 100 
euros). In all columns the controls include age dummies, wage group dummies (by 100 euros), wageg*after, 
ageg*after, and ageg*wageg interactions.  Columns 2 and 4 include also additional controls reported above. 
Standard errors in parentheses.* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
Table  7 reports  the  results of regression  where  the  dependent variable  is  log  real  hourly 
wages.  The  sample  consists  of  stayers,  i.e.  workers  who  have  remained  with  the  same 
employer for at least two periods. For the industrial sector there seems to be an almost 2 per 
cent decrease in hourly wages. For the service sector the results are less clear. The low wage 
subsidy had no or very little effect on hourly wages
20. 
                                                 
19 The subsidy increased the likelihood of becoming a full-time worker by 7 per cent. Subsidies had no impact on 
the working hours of workers who were already full-time workers in year t. 
20  Even though the hourly wages decreased in the industrial sector, the monthly wages increased, since there 
was an overall increase in working hours.  
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All these estimations were carried out using the subsidy eligibility definition, which is based 
on age and earnings in  year t-1. This includes both part-time and full-time workers. As a 
robustness check we examined how results change if eligibility for the subsidy is restricted 
only to full-time workers in year t-1. We included controls for full-time work in time t-1 in 
these regressions. This did not have an effect on our results. 
Table 7. Effect of low-wage subsidy on hourly wages for stayers (DDD estimates). 
 
  Industrial sector  Service sector 
Specification I  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Treat*after  -0.019  -0.012  -0.004  -0.003 
  (0.003)**  (0.003)**  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Controls    x    x 
Observations  196112  196112  151078  151078 
R-squared  0.38  0.48  0.55  0.57 
Specification II  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Amount of subsidy  -0.019  -0.016  -0.003  -0.003 
  (0.003)**  (0.002)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)* 
Controls    x    x 
Observations  196112  196112  151078  151078 
R-squared  0.63  0.66  0.76  0.77 
 
Dependent variable: hourly wage at t. The sample consists of workers who were 45-59 years old whose earnings 
were between 900 and 3000 euros in year t-1 and who remained with their employer until the end of year t. The 
upper panel reports the coefficient on the third level interaction (older*low-wage*after) of equation (3). In all 
columns controls include dummies for older, low-wage, (older*low-wage), after and (older*after) and (low-
wage*after) interactions. The additional controls for industrial sector (column 2) include educational category 
(4), gender, union contract, and two-digit industry and for service sector (column 4) gender, educational category 
and educational field. The lower panel reports the coefficient of amount of subsidy (in 100 euros). In all columns 
the controls include age dummies, wage group dummies (by 100 euros), wageg*after, ageg*after, and 
ageg*wageg interactions.  Columns 2 and 4 include also additional controls reported above. Standard errors in 
parentheses.* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
  7. Some Extensions 
 
As noted above, the comparison of changes in the exit rates, hours worked and wages between 
those who are eligible for the low-wage subsidy and those who are not reveals the impact of 
the reform, not the impact of actually receiving wage subsidies. As long as we are primarily 
concerned about the effects of introducing a low-wage subsidy policy, this is probably the 
main  parameter  of  interest.  However,  incomplete  take-up  is  likely  to  lead  to  smaller 
employment  effects  than  a  policy  that  would  automatically  reduce  payroll  taxes  for  the 
eligible workers. If we are interested in evaluating the effects of actually receiving low-wage  
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subsidies or in identifying labour demand elasticities due to a reduction in the labour costs, we 
need to account for the incomplete take-up rates. 
Moving away from analysing the effects of the policy change to the effects of a reduction in 
payroll taxes immediately introduces serious selectivity problems. Thus, in order to calculate 
the effects of actually receiving the subsidy we use eligibility for subsidy as an instrument for 
receiving  subsidy.  In  the  simplest  case,  where  both  the  eligibility  for  the  subsidy  and 
recipiency of the subsidy are dummy variables, the IV estimate for the effect of the subsidy is 
the Wald estimate 
] = R | E[S ] = R | E[S
] = R | E[Y ] = R | E[Y
= β
i i i i





                         (8) 
where Y is the outcome of interest, S indicates that the firm receives subsidies for worker i. 
The  numerator  in  this  expression  is  the  difference  in  the  outcome  variable  between  the 
persons that are eligible for the subsidy, and the denominator is the difference in the fraction 
actually receiving the subsidy. If receiving the subsidy is impossible for those who are not 
eligible for the subsidy 0 0 = ] = R | E[S i i , the Wald estimate simply scales up the effects by 
multiplying the difference between eligible and ineligible persons by the inverse of the take-
up rate.  
One should also note that as long as eligibility for the subsidy has some effect on the fraction 
receiving subsidies the  denominator of the equation is strictly positive, and inferences on 
whether the effect is significantly different from zero can be based directly on the numerator. 
Hence, if eligibility for the subsidy has no significant effect on the outcome of interest, neither 
has actually receiving the subsidy had any effect. 
To illustrate the role of the take-up rate, we show the impact of actually receiving the subsidy 
on  working  hours  when  eligibility  for  the  subsidy  is  used  as  an  instrument  for  received 
subsidies  (Table  8).  As  expected,  the  point  estimate  of  the  subsidy  has  increased  in  the 
industrial sector: since the take-up rate is close to 50%, the coefficient of the actual subsidy is 
roughly two times larger than the coefficient of eligibility alone. In the service sector, since 
the effects of eligibility are not significant, neither are the impacts of actually receiving the 
subsidy. The results regarding earnings (not shown) follow the same pattern. 
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Table 8. Instrumental variables estimates on the effect of actually receiving the subsidy on 
working hours for stayers. 
 
 
  Industrial sector  Service sector 
Specification I  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
person received 
subsidy 
0.111  0.113  0.003  0.002 
  (0.012)**  (0.012)**  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Controls    x  151078  151078 
Observations  196112  196112  0.03  0.05 
R-squared  0.11  0.16  0.003  0.002 
Specification II  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
the amount of the 
subsidy received 
/100 
0.035  0.032  0.001  0.000 
  (0.007)**  (0.007)**  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Controls    x  151078  151078 
Observations  196112  196112  0.10  0.11 
R-squared  0.33  0.36  0.001  0.000 
 
Dependent variable: log weekly working hours. The sample consists of workers who were 45-59 years old whose 
earnings were between 900 and 3000 euros in year t-1 and who remained with their employer until t.  The upper 
panel reports the coefficient on actually receiving the subsidy where receiving of subsidy is instrumented by 
eligibility. In all columns controls include dummies for older, low-wage, (older*low-wage), after and 
(older*after) and (low-wage*after) interactions. The additional controls for industrial sector (column 2) include 
educational category (4), gender, union contract, and two-digit industry and for service sector (column 4) gender, 
educational category and educational field. The lower panel reports the coefficient of the amount of the actual 
subsidy (in 100 euros), instrumented by the amount of the subsidy the person is eligible for (in 100 euros). In all 
columns the controls include age dummies, wage group dummies (by 100 euros), wageg*after, ageg*after, and 
ageg*wageg interactions.  Columns 2 and 4 include also additional controls reported above. Standard errors in 
parentheses.* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. First stage coefficient for columns (1) and (2) in spec I: are 
0.407 (0.006)**, 0.405 (0.006)** in spec II: The  (3) and (4) in spec I: 0.569 (0.003)*** and spec. II 0.564 
(0.003)**. 
 
The usual worry with the targeted subsidy systems is whether they lead to substitution or 
replacement effects. This ‘revolving door’ issue may arise if employers simply shed ineligible 
workers to be able to benefit more from the subsidies for eligible workers. Then even if the 
share of the targeted workers rises, overall employment may not necessarily increase.  Given 
that we did not find statistically significant employment effects for the target group, there is 
little need to examine the substitution effects in our case.  
Finally, if the goods market is non-competitive, the tax cut may also lead to increased profits 
because the market prices of the final goods do not necessarily move in a one-to-one relation 
with marginal costs. (See the analysis in e.g. Myles, Ch. 11, (1995) for commodity taxes; the 
analytics  are  similar  with  respect  to  the  taxation  on  labour.)  Our  analysis  using data  on  
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financial statements of Finnish corporations, combined with information about firm-specific 
low-wage subsidies, does not seem to reveal robust linkages between the amount of subsidies 
received and the profit rates.
21  
  8. Conclusions 
While  low-wage  subsidies are often regarded  as a promising way to  improve  the labour-
market prospects of low-skilled workers, the current evidence on their effectiveness is scarce. 
The evidence  is mainly based  on universal subsidy  schemes that are difficult to  evaluate 
because of the lack of a natural comparison group. Using detailed, individual-level, panel 
data, this paper estimated the employment effects of a Finnish low-wage subsidy scheme that 
was targeted to low-wage older workers. The clear eligibility criteria opened up a way to use 
the  DDD  estimation  strategy  that  allows  for  controlling  for,  for  example,  time-varying 
differences for labour demand of a given skill category. In fact, we find that leaving out the 
other control group, essentially returning to the standard DiD analysis similar to earlier papers 
in the field, would produce upwards-biased estimates of the impacts of the subsidy system. 
The results indicate that the subsidy scheme was not effective in increasing the employment 
of eligible workers. However, it might have led to increased working hours in the industrial 
sector by making some former part-time workers work full-time. The results regarding the 
impacts  on  wages  are  somewhat  ambiguous:  monthly  wages  rise,  but  hourly  wages  (in 
comparison to wages in the control groups)  seem to have dropped in some cases. This is 
interesting  because  it  is,  in  fact,  one  of  the  theoretical  predictions  of  the  impacts  of 
progressive taxes under imperfectly competitive labour markets.  
Quite why the results are so disappointing remains unclear. Perhaps the subsidy has not been 
sufficiently large, given that the treatment group (elderly workers) can consist of workers for 
whom it is particularly difficult to remain employed or to be hired. Or perhaps the wage 
demand  for  these  workers  is  simply  inelastic.  Needless  to  say,  these  results  cannot  be 
regarded as a universal case against low-wage subsidies. What they demonstrate is the need 
for  careful  evaluation  of  these  schemes  that  can,  one  hopes,  in  the  end,  help  design  the 
schemes in the best possible way. 
                                                 
21  This issue was analysed using register-data of all Finnish corporations, available from the tax authorities, 
from 2004-2007. The profit rate (profit/turnover) was explained in a fixed-effects framework by the subsidy 
(divided by turnover) the firm received and firm and year dummies. This analysis did not provide evidence that 
subsidies had increased the profitability of the subset of firms that received them.   
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